Does Board Gender Diversity Inﬂuence Financial Performance? Evidence from Spai by Reguera Alvarado, Nuria et al.
Does Board Gender Diversity Influence Financial Performance?
Evidence from Spain
Nuria Reguera-Alvarado1 • Pilar de Fuentes1 • Joaquina Laffarga1
Received: 16 May 2014 / Accepted: 13 June 2015
 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015
Abstract In recent years, several countries have enacted
guidelines and/or mandatory laws to increase the presence
of women on the boards of companies. Through these
regulatory interventions, the aim is to eradicate the social
and labor grievances that women have traditionally expe-
rienced and which has relegated them to smaller-scale jobs.
Nevertheless, and despite the advances achieved, the
female representation in the boardroom remains far from
the desired levels. In this context, it is now necessary to
enhance the advantages of board gender diversity from
both ethical and economic points of view. This article
examines the relation between board gender diversity and
economic results in Spain: the second country in the world
to legally require gender quotas in boardrooms and his-
torically characterized by a minimal female participation in
the workforce. Based on a sample of 125 non-financial
firms listed on the Madrid Stock Exchange from 2005 to
2009, our findings show that in the period analyzed the
increase of the number of women on boards was over
98 %. This suggests that compulsory legislation offers an
efficient framework to execute the recommendation of
Spanish codes of good governance by means of the
increase in the number of women in the boards of firms.
Furthermore, we find that the increase in the number of
women on the boards is positively related to higher eco-
nomic results. Therefore, both results suggest that gender
diversity in boardrooms should be incremented, mandatory
laws being a key factor to do so.
Keywords Corporate governance  Economic
performance  Gender diversity  Regulatory intervention 
Code of good governance
JEL classification M48  M14
Introduction
Although in recent years there has been a decisive trend
which has led to women holding board positions, the vast
majority of boardrooms are still made up of male directors
(Torchia et al. 2011). This recent increment of board
gender diversity has been mainly stimulated by the action
of some countries which have lately enacted guidelines
and/or mandatory laws with the aim of increasing the
presence of women on the boards of the listed companies.
Some national capital market regulators (e.g., the United
Kingdom, Germany, and Australia) have passed recom-
mendations and disclosure requirements. In contrast, other
countries (such as Norway, Spain, France, the Netherlands,
and Italy) have by legislation required that 40 % of a
company’s directors be women (Adams and Ferreira 2009;
Rose 2007). Via these regulatory interventions, the aim is
to eradicate the social and labor grievances that women
have traditionally experienced and which relegates them to
smaller-scale jobs. Nevertheless, and despite the advances
achieved, the female representation in boardrooms remains
far from the desired levels (less than 10 % of women on
German supervisory boards in the 30 largest listed com-
panies, Holst and Schimeta 2011), especially in the coun-
tries with non-mandatory gender quotas. It is therefore now
necessary to enhance the advantages of gender diversity on
corporate boards from both economic and ethical points of
view in order to break through the historic barrier which is
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a relevant restriction to the personal and professional
development of women who have entered the workforce
later than men. Nevertheless, while the ethical and social
reasons are beyond dispute and, from an ethical point of
view, board diversity increases the firms’ capability to lead
the interests of the different stakeholders (Harjoto et al.
2015), the positive impact on the economic results (per-
formance) of firms caused by a high gender diversity of
corporate boards is still not widely accepted by the spe-
cialized literature (Joecks et al. 2013). Some prior studies
associate gender diversity with negative economic perfor-
mance (De Andres et al. 2005), whereas some other
researchers show a positive relation (Campbell and Mı´n-
guez-Vera 2008). Some other researchers even find no
relation between both variables (Rose 2007).
However, and despite these unclear empirical results
and the fact that the existing theories (such as resource
dependence, human capital, agency, and social–psycho-
logical theories) do not clearly suggest either positive or
negative performance effects (Carter et al. 2010), there are
three arguments that support gender diversity positively
influencing the economic results of firms. This affirmation
is based on the following findings. First, women have been
shown to be different to men in several aspects: they are
more risk averse than men (Croson and Gneezy 2009;
Niederle and Vesterlund 2007), and often propose less-
aggressive strategies and sustainable investment criteria
(Apesteguia et al. 2012). Therefore, based on these intrinsic
characteristics of women, female directors may add value
to a male-dominated boardroom although proffering dif-
ferent perspectives (Burke 1997; Farrell and Hersch 2005).
Second, the trend of current investments toward socially
responsible investments1 encourages the investors and
analysts (market opinion makers) to consider, when mak-
ing investment decisions and reports, the existence of the
effective equality of women and men (gender diversity) in
the boardroom as a positive investment variable. This
fosters the preference for the shares of these companies and
thus increases their demand and market values (Bear et al.
2010; Fernandez et al. 2004). Consequently, the economic
results, the media visibility, and the demonstration of
commitments with respect to social and ethical concerns,
among others, will improve and result in a higher demand
of stocks and an increase in their price. Third, a study that
suggests a negative or no influence of the number of
women on company performance may be affected by
overall low or high female representation, invalidating
their results (for a detailed analysis of this aspect, see
Joecks et al. 2013).
Under this framework, the main objective of this article
is to provide new evidence on the relationship between the
increase of board gender diversity and company perfor-
mance. We analyze whether the presence of women in
firms’ boardrooms positively affects their economic results.
To do so, we employ a two-stage instrumental variables
(IV) regression. By means of the implementation of this
research methodology, the potential endogeneity and
causality existing in the relationship between gender
diversity and firm performance are analyzed. This could
bias the coefficients obtained. In addition, in this study, we
test the effect that the mandatory regulation promulgated
by the Spanish government has had on the presence of
women on boards. To do so, a dataset of Spanish compa-
nies listed on the Madrid Stock Exchange for the period
2005–2009 is used.
Weuse a sample fromSpain because of it being the second
country in the world to pass a mandatory law (the so-called
‘‘Law of Equality’’ enacted in 2007) which promotes women
as boardroom members. The objective of this legal norma-
tive is to attain 40 % of women on the boards of directors by
2015 (in the year before the implementation of this com-
pulsory legislation, 2006, this percentage was only 3.5 %).
Moreover, 1 year before—in 2006—the Spanish national
market regulator (CNMV) asked the listed companies to
voluntarily comply with the good corporate governance
practices contained in the Spanish Code for Good Gover-
nance (De Luis et al. 2007) which boosts an equilibrated
presence ofmen andwomen on boards. Therefore,motivated
by both the country and period analyzed in the present study,
we consider that this research is very timely. It is also a
unique opportunity since we analyze the first years of this
relevant law in which the presence of women on company
boards has substantially augmented. The number of women
on boards has supposed an increment of 98 % in the early
years of this legislation, increasing from52women at the end
of 2005 to 103 women in 2009 (see Table 3 in ‘‘Data and
Methodology’’ section). This is despite Spain being tradi-
tionally characterized as a European country with a lower
number of women in boardrooms (Heidrick and Struggles
2007) and their scarce participation in the Spanish work-
force, reflecting deep-rooted societal attitudes toward the
role of women (improving the equality of opportunities).
The remainder of the paper is as follows. The next
section is an overview of the previous findings and the
theoretical framework is included. The following section
has a description of the sample employed and the variables
considered. A theoretical explication of the methodology
used in this article is also provided in this section. Next we
present and discuss the results. Finally the last section
provides the study’s conclusions.
1 The United Kingdom Social Investment Forum (UKSIF) defines
socially responsible investments as investments that allow investors to
combine financial objectives and social values, linked to areas of
social justice, economic development, peace and the environment.
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Theoretical Background and Literature Review
Diversity, Governance and Performance
Relationship: A Theoretical View
The literature links the existence of a gender bias on boards to
a symptom of poor governance. In addition, the connection
between good governance, gender diversity and perfor-
mance has a long history in the literature (e.g., Adams and
Ferreira 2009; Campbell and Mı´nguez-Vera 2008; Gallego
et al. 2010; Jackling and Johl 2009; Post and Byron 2015;
Siciliano 1996). The composition of boards of directors has
been extensively analyzed, often from the agency perspec-
tive and frequently focused on the characteristic of inde-
pendence. In fact, one of the main goals of prior research has
been to establish links between board characteristics and firm
performance. Nonetheless, Carter et al. (2003) find that the
dominant theories in the study of corporate governance do
not provide a solid and complete explanation for the signif-
icant impact of diversity on performance. In this line, Kiel
and Nicholson (2003) suggest that, due to the multidisci-
plinary nature of the topic, no single theory can provide a
complete framework to form the relation between diversity
and performance. These authors argue that various elements
of multiple theories must be applied in different circum-
stances. Based on these findings we adopt an interdisci-
plinary approach built on the developments derived from
agency theory, the theory of resource dependency and the
stakeholder theory to examine the effect of corporate gov-
ernance gender diversity on firm performance.
First, agency theory is the main theoretical approach
underlying the idea that increased diversity in leadership
positions can boost performance. Agency theory focuses on
the conflicts that occur in organizations based on the con-
tractual relations between the principal and the agent. The
existence of asymmetric information and incomplete con-
tracts create agency conflicts between owners and man-
agers. These conflicts are associated with a cost insofar as
internal factors, such as corporate governance structures,
can reduce these costs and thus become important drivers
of performance. Accordingly, weak governance creates
agency costs and negatively affects the firm’s performance
(Core et al. 2006). The board of directors serves as a key
governance mechanism to help to align the interests of
managers and shareholders. Given the argument that a
more heterogeneous board acts as a better control because a
wider range of views increases board independence, gender
diversity on the board can be a mechanism to reduce the
costs associated with agency problems. This thus increases
the value of the firm (Hillman and Dalziel 2003).
Second, some prior research substantiates the impact of
diversity on the theory of resource dependency, framed in
organizational behavior research (Hillman and Dalziel
2003). Resource dependence theory—which is increasingly
used to analyze the functions and performance of boards of
directors (Gabrielsson and Huse 2004)—shifts the focus of
the relation between ownership and management to the
company’s links with its environment. That is, under the
resource dependence theory it is assumed that boards serve
to link the company to other external organizations in order
to address environmental dependencies. This approach
extends the centrality of the role of the board’s indepen-
dence because it emphasizes the ability of board members
to establish external links and resources to gather crucial
information for the company (Siciliano 1996). Diversity, in
this context, expands the directors’ profiles to improve
relations with competitors and customers, knowledge about
the industry, and the possibilities of access to finance. In
short, it increases critical resourcing, which leads to better
performance. Furthermore, the role of resource dependence
is very important in obtaining external financing for com-
panies that do not have access to capital markets (Vo-
ordeckers et al. 2007). Therefore, resource dependency
theory, in line with agency theory, also suggests that
increased diversity benefits firm performance.
Third, in tune with the resource dependency theory’s
focus on the importance of linking the company with its
environment, the diversity literature also suggests a theo-
retical perspective that is linked to corporate social respon-
sibility. Specifically, Fryxell and Lerner (1989) propose the
stakeholder theory that addresses the presence of demo-
graphic minority groups on boards of directors. The stake-
holder theory suggests that the firm must reflect the interests
of other stakeholders involved in the firm apart from the
shareholders, such as employees, customers, suppliers,
financiers, and so on. Recent literature on corporate gover-
nance frequently emphasizes this perspective. Namely those
other stakeholders besides shareholders contribute to the
creation of value for the company (Berman et al. 1999).
Following the stakeholder theory, gender diversity and the
incorporation of women on boards and in senior manage-
ment positions can be understood as important indicators of a
firm’s corporate social responsibility and a sign of a stake-
holder-oriented firm (Ibrahim and Angelidis 1994; Oakley
2000; Webb 2004). Furthermore, Hillman et al. (2002)
observe that introducing greater gender diversity on the
board allows more open government processes that ensure
the incorporation of stakeholder interests.
Board Gender Diversity
Asa consequence of the financial scandals and the high failure
rate of companies in the past decade (the Enron and World-
Com bankruptcies) and the financial crisis of 2008, in recent
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123
years, there has been a growing concern about improving the
effectiveness of boardrooms. One of the most relevant
boardroom trends to improve corporate governance has been
the inclusion of different types of diversity in boards (Hillman
et al. 2002). Diversity in the composition of the board of
directors is defined as a diverse mix of attributes, character-
istics and skills that individual members bring to the board
(Van der Walt and Ingley 2003). Two distinguishable cate-
gories of diversity are identified by the literature (Milliken and
Martins 1996; Pelled 1996). The first category is demo-
graphic, which is based on easily detectable observable
characteristics, such as gender, race, and academic level. The
second category refers to non-visible attributes such as
knowledge, skills, profiles and individual capacities.
Much of the research on diversity addresses demo-
graphic issues and among them gender diversity (Rosen-
zweig 1998). This focus on board gender diversity is
mainly justified by the gender imbalances which routinely
occur in the context of organizations in virtually all geo-
graphical areas and due to the laws and the society in
general forcing companies toward higher levels of ethical
and socially engaged attitudes. Research in this field has
also been enhanced by the massive female incorporation in
the workforce, their participation in the economy activity
and the continuing presence of the issue of gender equality
in the political agenda in recent years.
As can be observed in Table 1, in Europe, the representa-
tion ofwomen in the boardroomhas considerably increased in
the last decade (currently the European average is 17 %).
Nevertheless this remains low with respect to the U.S.
Moreover, the differences between European countries are
large. There are countrieswith a high percentage ofwomenon
the board, such as Norway—which has 39 %—and others,
e.g., Poland and Portugal, with lower levels of female repre-
sentation in the boardrooms—only 8 %. As can be observed,
the European country with the highest number of women in
the boards is Norway, which was the first country in the world
to force—by means of a mandatory law—companies to
increase their female presence on boards to 40 %. In contrast,
the situation of Spain (the second country in the world which
enacted, in 2007, a law to increment the female presence in
boardrooms to 40 %) is still poor, despite the improvements
carried out since the implementation of this law. These dif-
ferences between European countries can be explained by
their historical, political and sociological contexts and facts.
For example, Spain could not benefit from thewomen’s rights
movements which took place in Europe and the U.S. during
the 1960s because of the conservative military dictatorship it
endured from 1939 until 1975. During this time-period, it was
legally prohibited for women: to work, own property, open a
bank account or travel without their husband’s permission.
Even after 1975, the Spanish gender ideology was
Table 1 Proportion of women
directors on the board
Country % of women
directors represented
on the board
% of boards with no
women directors
on the board
Gender quota target
and expected date
Austria 10 20 No gender quota target
Belgium 15 15 33 % in 2017
Denmark 17 10 No gender quota target
Finland 27 0 No gender quota target
France 25 3 40 % in 2017
Germany 16 7 No gender quota target
Italy 11 20 20 % in 2013
Netherlands 19 4 30 % in 2015
Norway 39 0 40 % in 2008
Poland 8 40 No gender quota target
Portugal 8 30 No gender quota target
Spain 13 14 40 % in 2015
Sweden 27 0 No gender quota target
Switzerland 14 15 No gender quota target
United Kingdom 18 6 25 % in 2015
European average 17 12 –
United States 18 n. a. No gender quota target
Japan 2.4 n. a. No gender quota target
China 9.5 n. a. No gender quota target
India 7 n. a. No gender quota target
Source Heidrick and Struggles (2014), Spencer Stuart (2014)
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summarized in the Spanish Civil Code. This stated that
‘‘husbandsmust protect their wives andwivesmust obey their
husbands’’ (Carrera et al. 2001). Consequently, Spain has
historically been characterized as a countrywith a low level of
female representation in the social decision–making positions
in general and on boards in particular (Heidrick and Struggles
2007). In this type of society in which men, even when pro-
tected legally, control all decisions the Administration needs
to promote the role of women by using laws that obligate and
incite major ethical and gender equality attitudes. For this
reason, in 2007, the Spanish government enacted a compul-
sory legislation (the so-called ‘‘Law of Equality’’, Organic
Law 3/2007) to encourage the presence of women on boards
and reach 40 % in 2015. This mandatory legislation enabled
Spain to outstrip its historical social barriers toward the role of
women in the society and lead (together with Norway) the
new worldwide wave which fosters women’s rights through
mandatory laws. As a result of this legislation, the number of
women on the boards in Spain has substantially incre-
mented—from 3.5 % in 2006 to 13 % in 2013—although it
remains far from the target of 40 % for 2015. Considering the
goal to be an effective equality between women and men, the
current rate of representation of women in Spain is still low
but similar to that of other countries, such as Germany, the
United Kingdom or the Netherlands. That is, many European
countries are clearly not obeying the gender normative that
they themselves have promulgated. Therefore, even now
there seems to be a need to demonstrate to society and the
business industry that the presence of women on boards
should not be necessarily imposed by a legal regulation but
should be a common practice justified by reason of both
ethical and professional capacity. As the Spanish Securities&
Exchange Commission argues, gender-balanced boardrooms
are not only a matter of ethics and social justice but also an
efficiency objective and represent an economically rational
conduct. To justify these affirmations, in the next section, we
will show the most relevant and current studies that evidence
the relationship between firm performance and board gender
diversity.
Board Gender Diversity and Firm Performance
Gender diversity on the board from the perspective of good
governance has led researchers to contemplate the connec-
tion between the level of diversity and the economic results
of firms (Carter et al. 2010). This relation between increased
diversity and firm performance has gained a wide accep-
tance in the recent literature, and many previous empirical
studies have attempted to test whether a greater diversity on
boards has a positive impact on the performance or value of
the company. Robinson and Dechant (1997) argue that
companies with top management that consists of men and
women who bring different skills, knowledge and experi-
ences have access to more and better creativity and business
innovation. Similarly, Tyson (2003) concludes that diversity
on boards leads to better company performance, mainly due
to the existence of different views. Consequently, most
research affirms that heterogeneous groups produce higher-
quality decisions (Robinson and Dechant 1997), generate
more innovative solutions through cognitive conflict (Chen
et al. 2005) and influence the firm’s strategy direction
(Miller and Triana 2009). In this sense, many previous
studies (Bonn et al. 2004; Campbell and Mı´nguez-Vera
2008; Carter et al. 2003; Erhardt et al. 2003) suggest that an
increase in the number of women in boardrooms produces
an important improvement of the company’s economic
results (a positive relationship between board gender
diversity and firm performance). In contrast, there is another
stream of research that finds a negative relationship between
the number of female corporate board memberships and
firm performance (e.g., Adams and Ferreira 2009; Carter
et al. 2010; De Andres et al. 2005; Pelled et al. 1999;
Shrader et al. 1997), and some articles even found no
relation between both variables (Randøy et al. 2006; Rose
2007; Zahra and Stanton 1988). Nevertheless, according to
the arguments of Joecks et al. (2013), these studies that
suggest a negative or no influence of the number of women
on company performance may be affected by an overall low
or high female representation which invalidates their results.
The difference in the inborn characteristics between women
and men—such as women being more risk averse than men
(Croson and Gneezy 2009; Niederle and Vesterlund 2007;
Post and Byron 2015) and women often proposing less-
aggressive strategies and sustainable investment criteria
(Apesteguia et al. 2012)—are also two arguments that
support a more gender diverse board, since these may add
value to a male-dominated boardroom through proffering
different perspectives (Burke 1997; Farrell and Hersch
2005). In addition, based on the current investment trend
toward socially responsible investments, when making
investment decisions and reports the investors and analysts
(market opinion makers) consider the existence of the
effective equality of women and men (gender diversity) in
the boardroom as a positive investment variable, encour-
aging the preference for the shares of these companies and
thus incrementing their demand and market values (Bear
et al. 2010). Consequently, the economic results, the media
visibility and the demonstration of commitments with
respect to social and ethical concerns, among others, will be
improved and will lead to a higher demand of stocks and an
increase in their price. Finally, from the corporate reputation
perspective, several studies have investigated the effects on
the business reputation of some social, ethical and
accountability questions, finding that a favorable reputation
Does Board Gender Diversity Influence Financial Performance? Evidence from Spain
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(which is increased in environments with diversity) affects
profitability and can even reduce the cost of debt (Kang
et al. 2007; Tacheva and Huse 2006).
Based on the theoretical arguments presented above, we
test whether board gender diversity is linked to positive
economic results. To do so, we state the following research
hypothesis:
H1 The increase of the number of women on the boards
of companies is positively related to higher economic
results.
Data and Methodology
The dataset
Our dataset includes 497 observations of non-financial
firms listed in the most relevant and large Spanish stock
exchange index, the Madrid Stock Exchange General Index
(hereafter, MADX2), for the five-year period: 2005–2009.
To obtain our final sample, we follow a selection procedure
consisting of the application of several filters, which are
described step-by-step. First, the financial firms were
excluded because they have financial statements that are
not compared with the rest of the companies. Second, we
only introduced in our sample those firms that have a
positive equity in order to avoid financial bias from
bankrupt firms. Third, we also eliminated those observa-
tions (firm-year) with outliers for any variable considered
in our empirical study.
The financial information of the companies of the
sample was obtained from the Osiris database. In addition,
data on the composition of the boardroom was also col-
lected from the corporate governance reports of each
company analyzed.
We consolidate the economic and financial information,
in line with Abad et al. (2000), who highlight the potential
limitations of accounting information at the individual
level. Individual financial statements have been used in the
case of non-consolidated financial statements. Table 2
provides an overview of the sample by sector and year.
Table 3 provides a summary of the total membership of
the boards of directors and women directors. Although the
percentage of women directors increases over the time
horizon from 5.0 % in 2005 to 8.8 % in 2009, the presence
of the total number of women serving on boards of direc-
tors remains small. That is, Table 3 confirms women’s
under-representation in the boardroom, which is in line
with the findings obtained by Joecks et al. (2013), Mateos
et al. (2011), and Olcese et al. (2005).These results
demonstrate that in Spain, there is still a minimal presence
of women on boards despite the substantial increase that
took place in the first years of the mandatory law (2007 and
2008), which brought about an increase of the number of
women on boards. In 2009, the number of women in
boardrooms was 103, an increase of 98 % in comparison to
2005 (52 women on boards). As can be observed in
Table 1, the presence of women on the boards of Spanish
firms is currently 13 %, far from the level of 40 % aspired
to for 2015. Other countries, such as France, the Nether-
lands, the United Kingdom, and Italy—which likewise
require their firms to have legal gender quotas—also fail to
achieve the target percentages. Only Norway—with 39 %
of women in boardrooms—is close to the desired effective
equality of women and men in the boards of companies.
Variable Description
The measurement of firm performance in previous studies
varies considerably. However, there are two well-differ-
entiated approaches: on the one hand, those studies that use
2 MADX includes all the firms in the Spanish stock exchange IBEX-
35 and other large Spanish companies. MADX is considered by many
analysts and investors to be the most representative stock exchange
index in Spain.
Table 2 Description of the
sample by sector and year
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total
01–17 Agriculture, mining and construction 10 10 12 11 12 55
20–39 Manufacturers 41 41 43 44 45 214
40–49 Transport and communication 19 20 19 20 17 95
50–59 Wholesalers and retailers 0 0 0 0 3 3
60–67 Real estate 13 15 16 15 19 78
70–89 Services 9 10 11 10 12 52
Total 92 96 101 100 108 497
Table 3 Composition of boards of directors
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Directors (n) 1037 1074 1133 1160 1171
Women directors (n) 52 65 81 85 103
Total women directors (%) 5.014 6.052 7.149 7.328 8.796
N. Reguera-Alvarado et al.
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accounting measures and, on the other hand, those that use
Tobin’s Q. Following the previous literature, such as
Campbell and Mı´nguez-Vera (2008), Adams and Ferreira
(2009), and Garcia-Castro et al. (2010), we use Tobin’s Q
(TOBINQ) as measure of the financial performance of each
firm. Moreover, Tobin’s Q is a good proxy regarding the
company’s competitive advantage as it indicates the mar-
ket’s forecast of future earnings (Montgomery and Wern-
erfelt 1988). As is widely known, Tobin’s Q measures the
relationship between a company’s market value and its
replacement value or its physical assets (Sveiby 1997).
Accordingly, a high value for Tobin’s Q is associated with
the existence of greater intellectual capital, which increases
the financial performance of firms. This is why numerous
studies use Tobin’s Q as financial performance measure-
ment (Lopez and Morros 2014; Coles et al. 2008; Fich and
Shivdasani 2006; Haniffa and Hudaib 2006; Ferris et al.
2003).
In order to compare the number of board women with
the total number of directors on the board, we defined the
variable TAMCAD. This measures the board size or the
number of board members to relativize the percentage of
women in the boardroom. As proxies for the gender
diversity of the boards of directors, we use three variables.
First, we define the variable PWOMEN that measures the
percentage of women in the boardroom with respect to the
total number of board members. Second, according to
Campbell and Minguez-Vera (2008), we also calculate two
further measures of gender diversity that consider both the
number of gender categories (two: women and men) and
the evenness of the distribution of board members between
them. It is possible to combine these two attributes of
diversity—which apply to ‘variety’ and ‘balance,’ respec-
tively, into ‘dual concept’ measures of diversity (Stirling
1998). Based on this concept of diversity, in this study, two
variables are calculated (the Blau index and the Shannon
index). The Blau index is measured as 1Pni¼1 P2i , where
Pi is the percentage of board members in each category,
and n is the total number of board members. Values of the
Blau index for gender diversity vary from 0 to a maximum
of 0.5. The latter takes place when the board has an equal
number of men and women. The Shannon index is calcu-
lated as Pni¼1 Pi lnPi, where Pi and n have the same
meaning as in the previous expression. Here the minimum
value of the index is also zero, and diversity is at a max-
imum when there is an equal presence of both genders,
which results in a value of 0.69.
In addition to the variables associated with the presence
of women in the boardroom, four control variables were
also included in this study. First, in accordance with
Navarro and Martinez (2004) and Sanchez and Sierra
(2001), we control the firm size throughout the variable
LNTAB, which is calculated as the natural logarithm of
total assets. Second, following Adams and Ferreira (2009),
we introduce the natural logarithm of sales (LNSALES).
Third, we also add the lagged of the dependent variable
(TOBINQ) as is considered by Garcia-Castro et al. (2010)
and Adams and Ferreira (2009). Fourth, in order to include
the effect that the economic crisis has on the economic
results of the companies, in accordance with Guenther and
Young (2002), Jin (2005), and Lin and Shih (2003), two
additional variables with a close relation to the economic
cycle were considered: (i) the volatility of the Madrid
Stock Exchange General Index (MADX) and (ii) the
variation of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Table 4
shows the evolution of these variables for the period ana-
lyzed (2005–2009). Finally, we consider six sectors
according to the SIC sector classification and define
SECTOR as a dummy variable for each of the six sectors
considered. Appendix Table 10 provides a summary of the
variables and definitions.
Instrumental Variables
The previous literature (e.g., Adams and Ferreira 2009;
Campbell and Mı´nguez-Vera 2008; Srinidhi et al. 2011)
indicates that there are endogeneity and causality problems
in the relationship between gender diversity and the
financial performance of firms. In order to address these
concerns, we need to define instruments that are correlated
with the percentage of women in the boardroom, but
(essentially) uncorrelated with firm performance, except
through variables which we control for.
The main difficulty of this approach is to identify valid
instruments, since the majority of the observable firm
characteristics are already included in the main perfor-
mance equation, causing the system to be unidentified
(Campa and Kedia 2002). According to Baum (2006), a
valid instrument must satisfy two conditions: (i) not be
correlated with the error term in the main performance
equation, except through control variables included in the
regression (orthogonality condition), and (ii) be correlated
with the endogenous variable (weak instruments). Instru-
mental variables must therefore reasonably predict the
Table 4 Evolution of the
macroeconomic variables
Variable 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Volatility MADX 11.423 15.557 18.772 46.392 30.190
GDP (€) 909,298 985,547 1,053,161 1,087,788 1046,894
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endogenous variable (PWOMEN, BLAU, and SHANNON)
and not be correlated with the disturbance terms in our
main model (Tobin’s Q).Under these two conditions, three
instrumental variables were defined: the firm’s visibility
(IBEX), the mandatory law (LAW), and the compensation
of outside directors (REM).
The first instrument which we consider concerns the
visibility of the firm. As there is no finer-grained measure
of visibility, we operationalize it in this study by using a
dummy variable that shows whether a firm is listed in Ibex-
35 or not (IBEX). Firms listed in Ibex-35 are expected to
have a higher visibility, given that they are supposed to
have a higher exposure to investors, media, activists, etc.
(Garcia-Castro et al. 2010).
The second instrument is related to the effect that the
mandatory law (the so-called ‘‘Law of Equality’’) has. Aswas
argued previously, some countries (e.g., Spain) have pro-
moted the development of a mandatory law to obligate
companies to have aminimumnumber ofwomenonboards of
directors. Since the fulfilment of these laws increases board
gender diversity, there is a higher probability of increasing the
number of women directors in the years following the
enactment of this law. Therefore, we divide the period ana-
lyzed (2005–2009) into two sub-periods: one before the
mandatory law (2005–2006) and another after its enactment
(2007–2009). Consequently, the instrumental variable LAW
takes value 1 after the promulgation of the Law of Equality
(2007–2009) and 0 after this law was enacted (2005–2006).
The third instrumental variable is related to directors’
compensation. The previous literature shows that moderate
compensation for board members tends to follow the so-
called codes of good governance and usually engaging in
socially responsible behaviors (Garcia-Castro et al. 2010;
Adams and Ferreira 2009). Consequently, companies with a
moderate compensation of their directors will tend to follow
the codes of good governance and, in the case of Spain, will
usually include board gender diversity since this is recom-
mended by the Spanish code.3 We calculate the natural
logarithm of the director’s compensation (LNREM).
Methodology
In this study, two statistical methods are used, one for each
objective. First, to study whether the board gender diversity
influences the financial performance of firms, a two-stage
instrumental variable (IV) regression is implemented as
research methodology. The first-stage of an instrumental
variables (IV) regression is based on ordinary least-squares
(OLS) regression, while the second stage applies the gener-
alized method of moments (GMM). The objective of divid-
ing our statistical method into two steps is to address the
concern of potential endogeneity and causality associated
with the relations between the number of women in the
boardroom and financial performance. In addition, to assume
from a theoretical view that the relationship between gender
diversity and financial performance is endogenously deter-
mined, we empirically test this by using the GMM distance
test of endogeneity proposed by Baum et al. (2007).
Throughout the implementation of the two-stage
instrumental variables (IV) regression, we are assuming
that it is possible to determine gender diversity in terms of
a set of variables that influence board diversity but are not
correlated with performance (TOBINQ). As shown in
Eq. 1, we can assume that the presence of women on the
board of directors of a firm i in time t is given by
TOBINQit ¼ b0 þ b1 WOMENit þ b2  LNTABit
þ b3  LNSALESit þ b4  TOBINQt1
þ b5  GDPit þ b6 MADXit þ b7
 SECTORit þ eit
ð1Þ
where TOBINQ is the measure of firm performance,
WOMEN are the three variables used to measure the
gender diversity in the board of directors (PWOMEN,
BLAU, and SHANNON), LNTAB is the company size,
LNSALES are the company sales, LAG (TOBINQ) is the
lagged of the variable TOBINQ, GDP is the variation of the
gross domestic product, MADX is the volatility of the
Madrid Stock Exchange General Index, SECTOR are
dummy variables for each sector, and eit is the error term.
Second, in order to analyze the effect of the Spanish
mandatory legislation (‘‘Law of Equality’’) on the presence
of women in boardrooms, a panel data methodology is
performed. The panel data approach allows controlling for
the unobservable constant heterogeneity or fixed effects
term (Arellano 2003). This term is intended to reflect the
firm-level characteristics, and it thereby avoids the omis-
sion bias and renders more efficient estimates. The fixed
effects term is unobservable and, consequently, is sub-
sumed in the random disturbance. A key element in panel
data is the relation between the fixed effects term and the
other explanatory variables. This correlation is analyzed by
using the Hausman test, which tests the null hypothesis of
the lack of correlation between the independent variables
and the fixed effects term.4 Accordingly, we use the
3 The code indicates that when the number of women directors is low
or null, the board will have to explain the motives and the initiatives
adopted to correct this situation. When there are vacancies, it should
be guaranteed that the firm deliberately includes among the potential
candidates women who have the professional profile sought (this is in
recommendation 15 of the Unified Code of Good Governance).
4 This test follows a v2 distribution with as many degrees of freedom
as estimated coefficients. When the null hypothesis is not rejected, the
fixed effects term must be dropped with the within-groups technique.
Otherwise, the random effects method applies.
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Hausman test to choose the most suitable estimation
method.
Results
Evolution of number of women
Panel A of Table 5 provides the descriptive statistics of the
main sample. Women are clearly underrepresented as
women only average 7 % of total board membership. The
average board size is 11 directors of boards that include
women (TAMCAD), with an interquartile range between 9
and 13 members. Meanwhile, the average director’s com-
pensation (LNREM) is 10.67, while the median is 10.82.
The average size of the companies in the sample (LNTAB)
is 13.844. This is roughly equal to the median (13.724).
These results are in line with those obtained by Monterrey
and Sa´nchez-Segura (2008), and Mahdi et al. (2012).
Regarding company sales (LNSALES), firms have a mean
during the period of 13.217, while the median is 13.418.
Finally, with respect to the statistic relationship between
the variables used in this study, Table 5, Panel B, shows
the Pearson correlations between these variables. The most
relevant relations appear between the variables TOBINQ
and MTB, and between the proxies for the gender diversity.
The correlation between gender diversity proxies does not
disturb our results because we will build a different model
for each proxy. The remaining variables are not correlated,
or the relations are not very significant due to their coef-
ficients being low.
Instrumental Variables (IV) Estimation
Since, from a theoretical point of view, there are arguments
to justify a possible endogeneity and causality of the
relationship between gender diversity and firm perfor-
mance (Campbell and Mı´nguez-Vera 2008; Srinidhi et al.
2011), we applied the endogeneity test proposed by Baum
et al. (2007) to empirically test its existence. As shown in
Table 6, the results for this test are statistically significant,
and we therefore accept the null hypothesis, which cor-
roborates the presence of endogeneity. These results of the
test of endogeneity confirm our theoretical arguments and
Table 5 Descriptive statistics and Pearson correlations
Variable Mean SD Q1 Median Q2
Panel A. Descriptive statistics
TOBINQ 1.887 1.872 0.910 1.380 2.140
TAMCAD 11.254 3.732 9 11 13
PWOMEN 6.927 8.669 0 5.260 11.110
BLAU 0.115 0.131 0 0.099 0.197
SHANNON 0.193 0.206 0 0.206 0.349
IBEX 0.225 0.418 0 0 0
LAW 0.627 0.484 0 1 1
LNREM 10.677 1.391 10.086 10.820 11.455
LNTAB 13.844 1.903 12.391 13.724 15.185
LNSALES 13.217 2.030 11.872 13.418 14.430
Variable 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Panel B.Pearson correlations
1. TOBINQ 0.009 0.021 0.027 0.080* -0.062 0.049 -0.048 -0.016
2. PWOMEN 0.989*** 0.966*** 0.049 0.094** -0.048 -0.077* -0.046
3. BLAU 0.992*** 0.055 0.102** -0.037 -0.075* -0.045
4. SHANNON 0.065 0.106** -0.023 -0.064 0.036
5. IBEX -0.015 0.188*** 0.535*** 0.500***
6. LAW 0.023 0.072* -0.011
7. LNREM 0.396*** 0.447***
8. LNTAB 0.879***
9. LNSALES
***, **, and * indicate a significance of less than 1 %, less than 5 %, and less than 10 %, respectively
See Appendix Table 10 for a definition of all the variables
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suggest, for the three variables of gender diversity
employed in this paper (WOMEN, BLAU and SHAN-
NON), that the relationship between gender diversity and
financial performance is endogenously determined.
In line with previous studies (Adams and Ferreira 2009)
and in order to address the endogeneity and causality
concerns, we consider instrumental and control variables as
predictors. In Table 7, the results of the first-stage instru-
mental variables (IV) estimation (OLS regression) are
shown. These results allow for the prediction of gender
diversity in a firm. The resulting models account for around
50 % of the variance found in the variable TOBINQ
(PWOMEN, R2 = 0.46; BLAU, R2 = 0.50; BLAU,
R2 = 0.53). Regarding instrumental variables, the variables
IBEX and LNREM are significant, and their estimator
signs follow our expectations, and thus our models have
theoretical sense. In addition, Table 7 also suggests the
existence of a positive impact of the previous year’s per-
formance on future values of gender board diversity:
PWOMEN, 0.439 (p value\ 0.10), BLAU, 0.007
(p value\ 0.10), and SHANNON, 0.011 (p value\ 0.10).
Table 8 shows the results of the second-stage instru-
mental variables (IV) estimation (GMM estimation). In this
stage, the impact of gender board diversity (PWOMEN,
BLAU, and SHANNON) on the financial performance of
firms (TOBINQ) is analyzed—gender diversity has been
instrumented by using: IBEX, LAW, and LNREM. As can
be observed in Table 8, our results show a positive rela-
tionship between the number of women in the board
(PWOMEN, BLAU, and SHANNON) and the financial
performance of firms. The coefficients on diversity are, in
the three GMM regressions, positive and significant at the
10 % level (PWOMEN, 0.091; BLAU, 6.566; SHANNON,
4.562).Our findings therefore confirm our research
hypothesis and suggest, in line with the results of prior
studies (e.g., Campbell and Mı´nguez-Vera 2008; Bonn
et al. 2004; Carter et al. 2003; Erhardt et al. 2003; Post and
Byron 2015), that board gender diversity increases the
value of firms as it enables the board to have new ideas and
skills and views which are different.
Our results may be influenced by the tokenism effect
since the positive effects of gender diversity diminish in
countries with higher female economic participation and
empowerment (Low et al. 2015). Theoretically, tokenism
argues that the numerical proportion of female directors
has to be ‘‘significant’’ enough to allow the female ‘‘voice’’
to be heard and truly valued. Therefore, it is argued that a
critical mass is essential before any material difference in
performance can be observed (Torchia et al. 2011). How-
ever, the tokenism effect must have a limited influence in
our results since this is of particular relevance in areas—
such as Asia—where the participation of women in senior
corporate positions remains low (Jaquette 1997). In Spain,
although there is a misrepresentation of women in boards,
this is higher than in Asia.
Table 6 Results of test of endogeneity
PWOMEN BLAU SHANNON
Value test 4.877** 5.046** 5.579**
p value 0.027 0.024 0.018
***, **, and * indicate a significance of less than 1 %, less than 5 %,
and less than 10 %, respectively
Table 7 First-stage Second-stage instrumental variables (IV) esti-
mation (OLS)
PWOMEN BLAU SHANNON
IBEX 3.459** 0.051** 0.080**
LAW -0.607 -0.009 -0.015
LNREM -0.989* -0.014* -0.019*
TOBINQ (1 lag) 0.439* 0.007* 0.011*
LNTAB -0.704 -0.011 -0.017
LNSALES 0.572 0.009 0.015
MADX 0.007 0.000 0.000
GDP -0.418* -0.006* -0.009*
R2 0.46 0.50 0.53
F-statistic 2.36** 2.50** 2.52**
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes
***, **, and * indicate a significance of less than 1 %, less than 5 %,
and less than 10 %, respectively
Table 8 Second-stage instrumental variables (IV) estimation (GMM)
TOBINQ
(PWONEN)
TOBINQ
(BLAU)
TOBINQ
(SHANNON)
PWOMENa 0.091*
BLAUa 6.566*
SHANNONa 4.562*
TOBINQ (1
lag)
0.406*** 0.398*** 0.389***
LNTAB -0.063 -0.055 -0.048
LNSALES -0.046 -0.058 -0.073
MADX -0.031*** -0.032*** -0.032***
GDP 0.056 0.056 0.057
R2 0.54 0.53 0.51
F-statistic 6.62*** 6.55*** 6.31***
Industry
dummies
Yes Yes Yes
***, **, and * indicate a significance of less than 1 %, less than 5 %,
and less than 10 %, respectively
a PWOMEN, BLAU, and SHANNON have been instrumented using
the instrumental variables included in the first-stage OLS regression
shown in Table 7 above: IBEX, LAW, and LNREM
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Effect of the Law on Board Gender Diversity
In this section, the effect that the mandatory law (the so-
called ‘‘Law of Equality’’), which was promulgated in 2007
by the Spanish government, has had on the presence of
women on the board of the companies is analyzed. The
results, shown in Table 9, demonstrate that the enactment of
this compulsory regulation has significantly and positively
influenced board gender diversity in the boardrooms of
Spanish companies. In this sense, the results for the three
variables that measure board gender diversity (PWOMEN,
BLAU, and SHANNON) suggest a positive and significant
influence at the 1 % level effect of the law on the presence of
women in the boardrooms of firms. These results therefore
confirm the power thatmandatory laws have in order to boost
the presence of women on boards. Consequently, the pro-
motion of mandatory laws by governments is a key factor
that contributes to balancing the effective equality between
men and women and boards of directors and thus it is a
mechanism that must be employed in other countries where
the presence of women in the boardrooms remains low.
In summary, in line with previous studies (e.g., Bonn
et al. 2004; Campbell and Mı´nguez-Vera 2008; Carter et al.
2003; Erhardt et al. 2003) we find that the increase of
female representation in the boards of firms positively
influences their economic performance. Consequently,
based on the results of this study, companies should clearly
increase the percentage of women in their boardrooms for
both economic and ethical perspectives.
Discussion and Conclusions
This article offers new insights into the relationship between
board gender diversity and economic results (measured
through business success). To do so, a sample of 125 non-
financial companies listed on theMadrid Stock Exchange for
the four-year period 2005–2009 was used. The sample and
period considered in the present study are two noteworthy
characteristics that enhance the value of this research since
(a) the existing literature on board diversity and firm per-
formance is mainly focused on the US data, and (b) it is
possible to analyze the effects that the mandatory laws to
increase the female presence on the boards have on the
economic results of the firms (as explained above, Spain was
the second country in the world to pass—in 2007—a
mandatory legislation to promote women as members of
boardrooms). In addition, the suitability of Spain as the
country under study is strengthened by the social turnaround
that has taken place in the last decade. Moreover, this has
happened in a country that could not benefit from the
women’s rightmovements which occurred in Europe and the
U.S. in the 1960s because of the then conservative military
dictatorship being in place from1939 until 1975 and inwhich
female representation in the social decision–making posi-
tions was traditionally low. In this type of society in which
men, even when protected legally, control all decisions, the
Administration needs to promote the role of women by using
laws that obligate and incite major gender equality attitudes.
Our findings show two relevant conclusions. First, our
findings show a positive relationship between board gender
diversity and positive economic results. That is, the results
show that having more women in governance positions
increase the business performance. Hence, in line with
previous studies (e.g., Bonn et al. 2004; Campbell and
Mı´nguez-Vera 2008; Carter et al. 2003; Erhardt et al.
2003), we suggest that firms increase female representation
on their boards, since it positively influences their eco-
nomic results. Thus, board gender diversity adds value to
firms since it brings to the board new ideas and different
skills and views. For this reason, we encourage firms to
increase the presence of women in their boardrooms, since
it positively redounds on both economic results. Conse-
quently, it is necessary to promote the presence of women
on boards not by external coercive measures (such as laws)
but from within companies and due to social and labor
justice and professional skills. Moreover, it is beyond
dispute that the increasing of board gender diversity will
provide firms and society in general with substantial ethical
and social advances (Harjoto et al. 2015), as this decidedly
boosts the effective equality between men and women.
Thus, the incorporation of women in decision-making
positions, such as boardrooms, is necessary to eradicate the
social and labor grievances traditionally experienced by
women, and to improve the economic results of firms.
Second, regarding the effect of the compulsory legisla-
tion—the so-called ‘‘Law of Equality’’-on board gender
diversity—our results show that the enactment of this
mandatory law has significantly increased the presence of
women in boardrooms. Therefore, compulsory regulations
are a powerful mechanism that is in the hands of govern-
ments in order to achieve effective gender diversity in
boards, enforcing the accomplishment of the recommen-
dation of the Spanish code of good governance. However,
our descriptive results—in line with those obtained by
Table 9 Effect of the mandatory law on gender diversity
PWOMEN BLAU SHANNON
LAW 1.557*** 0.247*** 0.04***
Adj. –R2 0.01 0.01 0.01
F-Test 7.74*** 8.70*** 9.04***
Hausman Test 0.08 0.24 0.30
***, **, and * indicate a significance of less than 1 %, less than 5 %,
and less than 10 %, respectively
Does Board Gender Diversity Influence Financial Performance? Evidence from Spain
123
Joecks et al. (2013), Mateos et al. (2011), and Olcese et al.
(2005)—indicate that in Spain, there is still a low presence
of women in boardrooms despite the substantial increment
which took place in the first years of the mandatory law
(2007 and 2008) that brought about an increase in the
number of women on boards. Specifically, in 2009, the
number of women on boards was 103, with an increment of
98 % in comparison to 2005 (52 women on boards).
In conclusion, we suggest that companies must have a
more efficient view—from the economic perspective—
through the incorporation of a greater percentage of women
into their boards. This increase of female representation in
the boardrooms will provide firms not only with economic
benefits but also with greater ethical commitments, social
visibility, and the attraction of human talent. Based on our
findings, we clearly affirm that the regulatory interventions
carried out by several governments are a relevant assis-
tance to increase the number of women in boardrooms.
Therefore, this situation may only be explained by a wish
to maintain the historical status of man’s power over
women since from an economic view, our results sub-
stantially suggest the positive effect of board gender
diversity on the financial performance of the firms.
This research has strong implications for, on the one
hand, governments and law makers (market regulators)
and, on the other hand, shareholders and company man-
agers. Both groups should carefully consider our results in
order to enhance public policies and business decisions that
promote the incorporation of women in boardrooms.
Finally, the results of the present study are also really
interesting for all those countries which have not yet
enacted either mandatory laws or recommendations/dis-
closure requirements to increase the presence of women in
boardrooms, since our findings show the positive experi-
ence—from both ethical and economic points of view—
that such a law has had in the Spanish context.
This paper contributes to the existing literature on gender
diversity in boardrooms and firm financial performance in
three ways. First, to the best of the authors´ knowledge, this is
the first study inwhich there is an analysis of the effects that a
mandatory law, created to increase board gender diversity,
produce on the economic performance of Spanish compa-
nies. Because of the recent publication of these legislations
and the fact that only a few countries have imposed them, the
results of this paper have strong economic and public policy
implications, especially for the stakeholders, directors, and
law makers (mainly market regulators and governments).
Second, by using the test of endogeneity proposed by Baum
et al. (2007), we empirically analyze the existence of endo-
geneity in the relationship between gender diversity and firm
performance. Third, to date, this is the third research work
that studies the impact of the number of female corporate
boardmemberships in the Spanish capital market, sincemost
previous empirical evidences on this issue have been based
on the US market. Furthermore, we improve the two unique
studies for Spanish companies carried out by Campbell and
Mı´nguez-Vera (2008) andGallego et al. (2010) bymeans of a
more current dataset. Until 2006, there was an insufficient
number of women in boardrooms, and the period 2007–2009
(which is analyzed in this paper) produced the highest
increase of the percentage of women in boardrooms known
until now in the Spanish market.
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Appendix
See Table 10
Table 10 Definition of variables
Abbreviation Variable Definition
TOBINQ Tobin’s Q Stock price/replacement value
TAMCAD Size council Number of board members
PWOMEN Women board members % board members who are women
BLAU Index Blau Blau index of diversity
SHANNON Index Shannon Shannon index of diversity
IBEX Firm’s visibility Dummy variable, 1 if a company is listed in the Ibex-35 and 0 otherwise
LAW Mandatory law The period before and during the current mandatory law
LNREM Compensation Logarithm of outside directors compensation
LNTAB Company size Logarithm of total assets
LNSALES Company sales Logarithm of total sales
GDP Gross Domestic Product Variation of the Gross Domestic Product
MADX Madrid Stock Exchange General Index Volatility of the Madrid Stock Exchange General Index
SECTOR Sectors of activity Dummy variable for each sector considered
N. Reguera-Alvarado et al.
123
References
Abad, C., Garcia-Borbolla, A., Garrod, N., Laffarga, J., Larran, M., &
Pin˜ero, J. (2000). An evaluation of the value-relevance of
consolidated versus unconsolidated accounting information:
evidence from quoted Spanish firms. Journal of International
Financial Management and Accounting, 11(3), 156–177.
Adams, R. B., & Ferreira, D. (2009). Women in the boardroom and
their impact on governance and performance. Journal of
Financial Economics, 94, 291–309.
Apesteguia, J., Azmat, G., & Iriberri, N. (2012). The impact of gender
composition on team performance and decision-making: Evi-
dence from the field. Management Science, 58(1), 78–93.
Arellano, M. (2003). Panel data econometrics. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Baum, C. F. (2006). An Introduction to Modern Econometrics Using
Stata. Texas: Stata Press.
Baum, C. F., Schaffer, M. E., & Stillman, S. (2007). Enhanced
routines for instrumental variables/generalized method of
moments estimation and testing. The Stata Journal, 4, 465–506.
Bear, S., Rahman, N., & Post, C. (2010). The impact of board
diversity and gender composition on corporate social responsi-
bility and firm reputation. Journal of Business Ethics, 97(2),
207–221.
Berman, S. L., Wicks, A. C., Kotha, S., & Jones, T. M. (1999). Does
stakeholder orientation matter? The relationship between stake-
holder management models and firm financial performance.
Academy of Management Journal, 42(5), 488–506.
Bonn, I., Yoshikawa, T., & Phan, P. H. (2004). Effects of board
structure on firm performance: A comparison between Japan and
Australia. Asian Business & Management, 3, 105–125.
Burke, R. J. (1997). Women on corporate boards of directors: A
needed resource. Journal of Business Ethics, 16(9), 909–915.
Campa, J. M., & Kedia, S. (2002). Explaining the Diversification
Discount. Journal of Finance, 57(4), 1731–1762.
Campbell, K., & Mı´nguez-Vera, A. (2008). Gender diversity in the
boardroom and firm financial Performance. Journal of Business
Ethics, 83(3), 435–451.
Carrera, N., Gutie´rrez, I., & Salvador, C. (2001). Gender, the state and
the audit profession: Evidence from Spain (1942–1988). Euro-
pean Accounting Review, 10(4), 803–815.
Carter, D. A., D’Souza, F., Simkins, B. J., & Simon, W. G. (2010).
The gender and ethnic diversity of US boards and board
committees and firm financial performance. Corporate Gover-
nance: An International Review, 18(5), 396–414.
Carter, D. A., Simkins, B. J., & Simpson, W. G. (2003). Corporate
governance, board diversity and firm value.The. Financial
Review, 38(1), 33–53.
Chen, G., Liu, C., & Tjosvold, D. (2005). Conflict management for
effective top management teams and innovation in China.
Journal of Management Studies, 42, 277–300.
Coles, J. L., Daniel, N. D., & Naveen, L. (2008). Boards: Does one
size fit all? Journal of Financial Economics, 87, 329–356.
Core, J. E., Guay, W. R., & Rusticus, T. O. (2006). Does weak
governance cause weak stock returns? An examination of firm
operating performance and investors’ expectations. The Journal
of Finance, 61(2), 655–687.
Croson, R., & Gneezy, U. (2009). Gender differences in preferences.
Journal of Economic Literature, 47(2), 1–27.
De Andres, P., Azofra, V., & Lopez, F. (2005). Corporate boards in
OECD countries: Size, composition, functioning and effective-
ness. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 13(2),
197–210.
De Luis, P., Martinez, A., Perez, M., & Vela, M. J. (2007). La
diversidad de ge´nero en la alta direccio´n de las mayores
empresas espan˜olas. Investigaciones Europeas de Direccio´n y
Economı´a de la Empresa, 13(2), 33–53.
Erhardt, N. L., Werbel, J. D., & Shrader, C. B. (2003). Board of
director diversity and firm financial performance. Corporate
Governance: An International Review, 11(2), 102–111.
Farrell, K. A., & Hersch, P. L. (2005). Additions to corporate boards:
The effect of gender. Journal of Corporate Finance, 11(1–2),
85–106.
Fernandez, E., Gomez, S., & Cuervo, A. (2004). The stock market
reaction on the introduction of best practices codes by Spanish
firms. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 12(1),
29–46.
Ferris, S. P., Jagannathan, M., & Pritchard, A. C. (2003). Too busy to
mind the business? Monitoring by directors with multiple board
appointments. The Journal of Finance, 58(3), 1087–1112.
Fich, E. M., & Shivdasani, A. (2006). Are busy boards effective
monitors? The Journal of Finance, 61(2), 689–724.
Fryxell, G. E., & Lerner, L. D. (1989). Contrasting corporate profiles:
Women and minority representation in top management posi-
tions. Journal of Business Ethics, 8(5), 341–352.
Gabrielsson, J., & Huse, M. (2004). Context, behaviour and evolution:
Challenges in research on boards and governance. International
Studies in Management and Organization, 34, 11–36.
Gallego, I., Garcı´a, I., & Rodrı´guez, L. (2010). The influence of
gender diversity on corporate performance. Spanish Accounting
Review, 13(1), 53–88.
Garcia-Castro, R., Arin˜o, M., & Canela, M. (2010). Does social
performance really lead to financial performance? Accounting
for endogeneity. Journal of Business Ethics, 92, 107–126.
Guenther, A., & Young, P. (2002). Financial reporting environments
at international capital mobility. Journal of Accounting
Research, 8, 41–57.
Haniffa, R., & Hudaib, M. (2006). Corporate governance structure
and performance of Malaysian listed companies. Journal of
Business Finance & Accounting, 33(7–8), 1034–1062.
Harjoto, M., Laksmana, I., and Lee, R. (2015). Board diversity and
corporate social responsibility. Journal of Business Ethics,
forthcoming.
Heidrick, and Struggles. (2007). Corporate Governance in Europe:
2007 Report. Paris.
Heidrick, and Struggles. (2014). Towards dynamic governance 2014.
European Corporate Governance Report.
Hillman, A. J., Cannella, A. A., & Harris, I. C. (2002). Women and
racial minorities in the boardroom: How do directors differ?
Journal of Management, 28(6), 747–763.
Hillman, A. J., & Dalziel, T. (2003). Board of directors and firm
performance: Integrating agency and resource dependence
perspectives. Academy of Management Review, 28(3), 383–396.
Holst, E., & Schimeta, J. (2011). 29 von 906: Weiterhinkaum Frauen
in top-Gremiengrober Unternehmen. Wochenbericht des DIW, 3,
2–10.
Ibrahim, N. A., & Angelidis, J. P. (1994). Effect of board members’
gender on corporate social responsiveness orientation. Journal of
Applied Business Research, 10(1), 35–40.
Jackling, B., & Johl, S. (2009). Board structure and firm performance:
Evidence from India’s top companies. Corporate Governance:
An International Review, 17(4), 492–509.
Jaquette, J. S. (1997). Women in power: from tokenism to critical
mass. Foreign Policy, 108, 23–37.
Jin, Q. (2005). Business Cycle, Accounting Behavior and Earnings
management. Unpublished PhD dissertation (Hong Kong
University of Science and Technology).
Joecks, J., Pull, K., & Vetter, K. (2013). Gender Diversity in the
Boardroom and Firm Performance: What exactly constitutes a
‘‘critical mass?’’. Journal of Business Ethics, 118(1), 61–72.
Does Board Gender Diversity Influence Financial Performance? Evidence from Spain
123
Kang, H., Cheng, M., & Gray, S. J. (2007). Corporate governance and
board composition: Diversity and independence of Australian
boards. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 15(2),
194–207.
Kiel, G. C., & Nicholson, G. J. (2003). Board composition and
corporate performance: How the Australian experience informs
contrasting theories of corporate governance. Corporate Gover-
nance: An International Review, 11(3), 189–205.
Lin, Z., and Shih, M. (2003). Earnings management in economics
downturns and adjacent periods: Evidence from the 1990–1991
recession. Working Paper (National University of Singapore).
Lopez, F. J., & Morros, I. (2014). Boards of directors and firm
performance: the effect of multiple directorships. Spanish
Journal of Finance and Accounting, 43(2), 177–192.
Low, D.C.M., Roberts, H., and Whiting, R.H. (2015). Board gender
diversity and firm performance: Empirical evidence from Hong
Kong, South Korea, Malaysia and Singapore. Pacific-Basin
Finance Journal, Forthcoming.
Mahdi, M., Mahdi, S., Seyed, J., & Masomeh, N. (2012). A Study of
relationship between board characteristics and earning manage-
ment: Iranian scenario. Universal Journal of Management and
Social Sciences, 2(3), 12–29.
Mateos, R., Gimeno, R., & Escot, L. (2011). Disentangling discrim-
ination on Spanish boards of directors. Corporate Governance
an International Review, 19(1), 77–95.
Miller, T., & Triana, M. (2009). Demographic diversity in the
boardroom: Mediators of the board diversity-firm performance
relationship. Journal of Management Studies, 46(5), 755–786.
Milliken, F. J., & Martins, I. L. (1996). Searching for common
threads: Understanding the multiple effects of diversity in
organizational groups. Academy of Management Journal, 21(2),
402–433.
Monterrey, J., & Sa´nchez-Segura, A. (2008). Rotacio´n y dependencia
econo´mica de los auditores: Sus efectos sobre la calidad del
resultado en las compan˜ı´as cotizadas espan˜olas. Investigaciones
Economicas, 31, 119–159.
Montgomery, C., & Wernerfelt, B. (1988). Tobin’s q and the
Importance of Focus in Firm Performance. American Economic
Review, 78(1), 246–250.
Navarro, J., & Martı´nez, I. (2004). Earnings management and audit
quality in Spain: an empirical study. Spanish Journal of Finance
and Accounting, 33(123), 1025–1061.
Niederle, M., & Vesterlund, L. (2007). Do women shy away from
competition? Do men compete too much? Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 122(3), 1067–1101.
Oakley, J. G. (2000). Gender-based barriers to senior management
positions: Understanding the scarcity of female CEOs. Journal
of Business Ethics, 27(4), 321–334.
Olcese, A., Besco´s, M., Botı´n-Sanz, A.P., De La Cruz, M.V., Jime´nez,
I., and Ureta, J.C. (2005).Diversidad de ge´nero en los consejos
de administracio´n de las sociedades cotizadas y cajas de ahorro
espan˜olas. Papeles de la Fundacio´n No 12, Fundacio´n de
Estudios Financieros, Madrid.
Pelled, L. H. (1996). Demographic diversity, conflict, and work group
outcomes: An intervening process theory. Organization Science,
7(6), 615–631.
Pelled, L. H., Eisenhardt, K. M., & Xing, K. R. (1999). Exploring the
black box: An analysis of work group diversity, conflict, and
performance. Administrative Science Quarterly, 44(1), 1–28.
Post, C., and Byron, K. (2015). Women on boards and firm financial
performance: A meta-analysis. Academy of Management.
Forthcoming.
Randøy, T., Thomsen, S., and Oxelheim, L. (2006). A Nordic
perspective or corporate board diversity. Nordic Innovation
Centre.
Robinson, G., & Dechant, K. (1997). Building a business case for
diversity. The Academy of Management Executive, 11(3), 21–31.
Rose, C. (2007). Does female board representation influence firm
performance? The Danish evidence. Corporate Governance: An
International Review, 15(2), 404–413.
Rosenzweig, P. (1998). Managing the new global workforce:
Fostering diversity, forging consistency. European Management
Journal, 16(6), 644–652.
Sa´nchez, A., & Sierra, G. (2001). El Informe de Auditorı´a y su
Relacio´n con las Caracterı´sticas Corporativas. Spanish Journal
of Finance and Accounting, 30(108), 349–391.
Shrader, C. B., Blackburn, V. B., & Iles, P. (1997). Women in
management and firm financial performance: An explorative
study. Journal of Managerial Issues, 9(3), 355–372.
Siciliano, J. I. (1996). The relationship of board member diversity to
organizational performance. Journal of Business Ethics, 15(12),
1313–1320.
Srinidhi, B., Ferdinand, A. G., & Tsui, J. (2011). Female Directors
and Earnings Quality. Contemporary Accounting Research,
28(5), 1610–1644.
Spencer Stuart. (2014). Board index 2013.
Stirling, A. (1998). On the Economics and Analysis of Diversity.
Science Policy Research Unit Electronic Working Paper Series,
Paper no. 28, University of Sussex.
Tacheva, S., and Huse M. (2006). Women directors and board task
performance: Mediating and moderating effects of board work-
ing style. Proceedings of the European Academy of Management
Conference. Oslo.
Torchia, M., Calabro`, A., & Huse, M. (2011). Women directors on
Corporate Boards: From tokenism to critical mass. Journal of
Business Ethics, 102(2), 299–317.
Tyson, L. (2003). The Tyson report on the recruitment and
development of nonexecutive directors, London Business
School, UK. Available in http://www.london.edu/tysonreport.
Van Der Walt, N., & Ingley, C. (2003). Board dynamics and the
influence of professional background, gender and ethnic diver-
sity of directors. Corporate Governance: An International
Review, 11(3), 218–234.
Voordeckers, W., Van Gils, A., & Van Den Heuvel, J. (2007). Board
composition in small and medium-sized family firms. Journal of
Small Business Management, 45(1), 137–156.
Webb, E. (2004). An examination of socially responsible firms’ board
structure. Journal of Management and Governance, 8(3),
255–277.
Zahra, S., & Stanton, W. (1988). The implications of board of
directors: Composition for corporate strategy and performance.
International Journal of Management, 5(2), 261–272.
N. Reguera-Alvarado et al.
123
